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solved, or even palliated, till we have worked through, not merely the
epibtemological ' inhibitions,' as one might term them, but also
through the physiological and psychological facts in detail. It were
much to be desired that a master like Dr. Ward, equipped, not
merely with the requisite knowledge, but with a peculiar detachment,
insight and cool acuteness, should return to this problem in its most
recent phases. I, for one, must hold that, till some thorough treat-
ment be forthcoming, monistic construction cannot avoid the pitfalls
of otiose acquiescence. And it is by no means certain that the ' Spir-
itualistic Monism,' offered by Dr. Ward as his final solution, is free
entirely from this very limitation.
Yet, whatever may be said in the way of criticism, one would fall
short of his duty did he fail to remind readers that, taken as a whole,
these Gifford Lectures must be classed with the most important
British contributions to philosophy in recent years—with Green's
' Prolegomena to Ethics,' E. Caird's ' Kant,' F . H. Bradley's ' Appear-
ance and Reality.' True, the office of these last is different, and their
initial audience was not of the same character. Nevertheless, in what
Dr. Ward implies, more perhaps than in what he actually states, he
deserves the closest attention of philosophical students, more especially
of those who hold, like the present writer, that the immediate future
of philosophy depends on the manner in which it leckons with the
positive sciences.
R. M. WENLEY.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.
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Animal Behaviour. By C. LLOYD MORGAN, F.R.S. Illustrated.
London, Edward Arnold. 1900.
The author set out with the purpose of preparing a new edition
of his ' Animal Life and Intelligence,' but concluded, and all will
agree wisely, to write a new book, into which very little material from
the above or his other works has been introduced.
The chapters on organic behavior of plants and animals, with
pictorial illustrations, are written in order to show among other
things that while there is beautiful adaptation effective to a definite
biological end, there is an absence of a guiding consciousness.
Among plants there is no evidence of profiting by experience. After a
glance at reflex action the discussion of the evolution of organic behavior
is considered. To the question. Are acquired modes of behavior in-
herited? a negative answer is provisionally given, though it is admitted
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that if this be not the case ' the method of natural selection in racial
progress is curiously indirect.'
Natural selection develoos congenital definiteness of response and
such innate plasticity as is of advantage under the conditions of
existence, uniform conditions tending to emphasize the former, vari-
able conditions the latter.
Professor Morgan concludes that a belief in an accompanying con-
sciousness in the organic behavior of animals is wise, since the asso-
ciations which take part in the guidance of behavior are so varied and
delicate that a skeptical attitude is a greater strain than is a belief in con-
scious control. And if his remark were extended it would explain
very well the attitude of some who are disposed to be somewhat more
conservative in regard to many points in animal behavior than Professor
Morgan and those of his way of thinking.
Speaking of the explanation of the behavior of a chick, after some
experience, the author well says: " Sentience is not sufficient for
guidance; there must be consentience involving the presence of sev-
eral elements; they form constituent parts of the coalescent situation
as a whole, of which alone the chick is personally conscious, without
analysis of detail," though it is felt that the manner in which con-
sciousness affects behavior is far from clear.
Briefly, consciousness in the first stage of development may be re-
garded as an accompaniment, in the second as a guide, and in the third
as a judge. The latter must of course not be attributed to animals—
it is characteristic of man alone.
Instinctive behavior is treated at considerable length. Mr. Mar-
shall's views are subjected to a critical examination, with the general
result that while Professor Morgan agrees that instinctive acts tend to
the well-being of the individual and the preservation of the species he
fjpes not hold that the biological end is the objective mark of an
instinct. On the other hand approval is expressed of Dr. Peckham's
definition of instinctive behavior: "A l l complex acts which are per-
formed previous to experience, and in a similar manner by all mem-
bers of the same sex and race."
Professor Morgan himself would define instinctive behavior as
"comprising those complex groups of coordinated acts which are, on
their first occurrence, independent of experience; which tend to the
well-being of the individual and the preservation of the race; which are
due to the cooperation of external and internal stimuli; which are
similarly performed by all the members of the same more or less
restricted group of animals; but which are subject to variation, and
PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. 301
to subsequent modification under the guidance of experience." Most
readers will agree that this leaves little if anything to be desired as a
general statement of the case.
Then follows an examination of the subject as it is illustrated by
insects and birds.
The characteristics of instinctive behavior in birds are the follow-
ing:
1. That which is inherited is essentially a motor response or train
of such responses. The compound reflex action of Herbert Spencer.
2. These often show very accurate and nicely-adjusted hereditary
coordinations.
3. They are evoked by stimuli, the general tvpe of which is fairly
definite, and may in some cases be in response to particular objects.
4. They are also generally shown under conditions which lead us
to infer the presence of an internal factor, emotional or other.
•j. There does not seem to be any evidence of inherited knowledge
or experience.
While there is probably in all cases present some internal prompt-
ing, it is not equally clear whether a definite external stimulus is invari-
ably necessary. If the latter is indispensable, the reviewer can testify
that in some instances ' definite ' must be given a very liberal mean-
ing, if not replaced by another term. A very small spark indeed in
some cases—if spark at all—is required for the combustion which
sometimes seems to be all but spontaneous.
The author does not look with favor on the term ' acquired in-
stincts ' of Wundt.
" How comes it, then, that the chick does not instinctively re-
spond by appropriate behavior to the sight of water?'' asks the author.
Some of us would question this. We hold that the chick does re-
spond to the sight of water under the conditions of its normal exist-
ence and frequently under the more or less unnatural conditions we
substitute. It is merely a case of a less certain or more tardy response
than that to food, so that arguments founded on this supposed fact
must carry little weight, whether applied to heredity or other prob-
lems.
While frankly admitting that a perfectly satisfactory explanation
of intelligent behavior cannot be given at present, Professor Morgan
thinks that "from all parts of the automatically working organic
machine messages come in to the center of conscious control, and that
in accordance with the net result of all these messages, past and
present, tinged with pleasure or pain, other messages go out to the
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automatic centers, and by checking their action here and enforcing it
there, give new direction to resulting behavior."
The physiologists and neurologists at all events will approve of this
view of the case, and probably the psychologists equally. When,
however, the author goes so far as to say, in comparing intelligent
and instinctive behavior, that " i n performing the instinctive act, the
animal seems to have no more individuality or originality than a piece
of adequately wound clockwork," we must dissent. This is far too
strongly put for the instincts of the higher animals at least.
Professor Morgan makes generous use of the valuable researches
of the Peckhams. Speaking of certain behavior of the wasp, he says :
" Here we have intelligent behavior rising to a level to which some
would apply the term rational. For the act may be held to afford
evidence of the perception of the relation of the means employed to
an end to be attained, and some general conception of purpose."
The author thinks that the question as to whether animal intelli-
gence attains to the ' rational' is more likely to be answered through
experiment than by chance observations.
We would say both by experiments and by carefully made obser-
vations, of which the latter would likely prove the more important, as
being more likely to find the animal under natural conditions.
Professor Morgan seems to have based his conclusions in regard
to the intelligence of animals, especially dogs, on some observations or
experiments with one or two dogs he possessed. He lays great stress
on several failures of his fox terrier to get a stick through a fence.
Would a well-trained retriever, collie or poodle have had a like diffi-
culty—although their experience had not been in the direction referred
to in this case ? The reviewer's study of many breeds of dogs leads
him to take a much higher view of their intelligence than Professor
Morgan seems to believe justifiable. His experience with throwing a
ball has been very instructive. In this he has generally tried experi-
ments, sometimes at the same time, with a half dozen dogs of dis-
similar breeds. They behaved very differently—perhaps more so
than the same number of small boys would have done. The St.
Bernard showed a great deal the most of what one might call
' gumption.' He took in the situation by far the best, and adapted to
it in a surprising way, while the terriers were altogether more machine-
like.
Dr. Thorndike's experiments are reviewed and criticised some-
what unfavorably, though Professor Morgan in many of his positions
on the subject of animal intelligence does not differ greatly from Dr.
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Thorndike. Says the author, commenting on the behavior of his dog
in lifting the latch of the gate: " He did it with the back of his head.
I could not get him to do it (more gracefully) with his muzzle." And
why should he, seeing that the muzzle is a very sensitive part in dogs?
The author holds that " i t may be said that between the method
of intelligence and that of fully developed rational procedure there is
a wide gap which must have been bridged over in the course of mental
evolution. Unquestionably, and in contending that the methods of the
animal are predominantly intelligent, I am far from wishing to assert
dogmatically that in no animals are there even the beginnings of a
rational scheme. * * • We shall probably have to await the further
results which must be the outcome of patient and well-directed child-
study."
Naturally the reviewer read the above with hopeful satisfaction.
With Professor Morgan the case against rational behavior is, at least,
not yet closed.
It is believed that growth in intelligence takes place by what the
author designates as ' condensation of experience by an elimination
of detail and the survival of essential features'—also by the elimina-
tion of those modes of behavior which were not efficacious, i. e., by
the functional selection of Baldwin. According to this view an animal
may come very near to the attainment of the abstract without quite
reaching it.
With the development of the higher intelligence instincts decay,
which possibly explains why man has so few ' stereotyped instincts ' ;
nevertheless residua remain, which explains much.
Under ' Imitation ' Baldwin's ' circular process ' is discussed and
its truth admitted with certain important reservations; but Professor
Morgan does not favor on the whole the extended usage of the term
that Baldwin would advocate.
On the other hand the author cannot endorse Dr. Thorndike in
his extreme position on the subject of imitation, although he does not
apparently believe in ' reflective imitation,' though ' intelligent imita-
tation ' is conceived to be of great importance, as also ' instinctive
imitation.' In ants, difference in behavior is thought to give rise to
suggestive effects on the other members of the community, rather than
that their conduct is dependent on communication by any definite sys-
tem of signs; nor does the author believe that dogs understand words
in the proper sense of the term.
While in general Professor Morgan is not convinced that animals
reason, he is not prepared to assert dogmatically that they do not, for
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he says: " Presumably in the ant, rook, and beaver anything like an
ideal scheme of thought based on reflection, if it exist, is as, yet ex-
ceedingly indefinite."
Under ' Play and Courtship ' the views of Professor Groos are con-
sidered, and the author would have the former attach more importance
to courtship in generating and strengthening the ardor of the male.
Nor would Professor Morgan think it necessary to introduce ' any-
thing so psychologically complex as the conscious illusion of make-
believe ' in order to explain certain forms of mock combat, etc. He
would differ from those who hold that play is always the outcome of
a surplus of energy. He instances the case of a sick kitten attempt-
ing to play as evidence to the contrary.
The infrequency with which the term ' association of ideas,' appar-
ently used by many to cover psychological ignorance, occurs in this
work is noteworthy.
One lays down this volume with the feeling that it is a psycho-
logical and literary production of an unusually high order.
WESLEY MILLS.
MCGIU, UNIVERSITY.
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